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1 Introduction
Intuitively a cooperative equilibrium is a collective decision adopted by a group of individuals
that can be viewed as stable (i.e., an equilibrium) against all feasible deviations by single
individuals or by proper subgroups. While modelling the possibilities of cooperation may not
pose the social scientist particular problems, at least once an appropriate economic or social
situation is clearly outlined, the denition of stability may be a more demanding task for
the modeler. This because the outcome, and the protability, of playersdeviations heavily
depends on the conjectures they make over the reaction of other players. As an example,
a neighborhood rule to keep a common garden clean possesses di¤erent stability properties
whether the conjectured reactions in the event of shirking is, in turn, that the garden would
be kept clean anyway or, say, that the common garden would be abandoned as a result.
Similarly, countries participating to an international environmental agreement will possess
di¤erent incentive to comply with the prescribed pollution abatements whether defecting
countries expect the other partners to be inactive or to retaliate.
The main focus of the present paper are cooperative equilibria of games in strategic form.
A cooperative equilibrium of a game in strategic form can be dened as a strategy prole such
that no subgroup of players can make e¤ective- by means of alternative strategy proles -
utility levels higher for its members than those obtained at the equilibrium. As expressed in
the example above, the content of the equilibrium concept depends very much on the utility
levels that each coalition can potentially make e¤ective and this, in turn, depends on the
conjectures over the reactions induced by deviations. In this paper we propose a cooperative
equilibrium for games in strategic form, based on the assumption that players deviating
from an arbitrary strategy prole have non zero conjectures on the reaction of the remaining
players. More precisely, the conjectural cooperative equilibrium we propose assumes that the
remaining players are expected to optimally and independently react according to their best
response map.
1.1 Related literature
The problem of dening cooperative equilibrium concepts have been centered on the formula-
tion of conjectures ever since the pioneering work of von Neumann and Morgensterns (1944).
The concepts of  and  core, formally studied by Aumann (1967), are based on their early
proposal of representing the worth of a coalition as the aggregate payo¤ that it can guarantee
its members in the game being played. Formally obtained as the minmax and maxmin payo¤
imputations for the coalition in the game played against its complement, the  and  charac-
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teristic functions express the behaviour of extremely risk averse coalitions, acting as if they
expected their rivals to minimize their payo¤. Although fullling a rationality requirement
in zero sum games,  and -assumptions do not seem justiable in most economic settings.
Moreover, the little protability of coalitional objections usually yield very large set of so-
lutions (e.g., large cores). Another important cooperative equilibrium proposed by Aumann
(1959), denoted Strong Nash Equilibrium, extends the Nash Equilibrium assumption of zero
conjectures to every coalitional deviation. Accordingly, a Strong Nash Equilibrium is de-
ned as a strategy prole that no group of players can protably object, given that remaining
players are expected not to change their strategies. Strong Nash Equilibria are at the same
time Pareto optima and Nash Equilibria; in addition they satisfy the Nash stability require-
ment for each possible coalition. As a consequence, the set of Strong Nash Equilibria is often
empty, preventing the use of this otherwise appealing concept in most economic problems of
strategic interaction.
Other approaches have looked at the choice of forming coalitions as a strategy in well
dened games of coalition formation (see Bloch (1997) for a survey). Among others, the
gamma and delta games in Hart and Kurz (1985) constitute a seminal contribution.1 The
gamma game, in particular, is related to the present analysis, since it predicts that if the grand
coalition N is objected by a subcoalition S, the complementary set of players splits and act as
a noncooperative fringe. On the same behavioural assumption is based the concept of  core,
introduced by Chander and Tulkens (1997) in the analysis of environmental agreements, where
a characteristic function is obtained as the Nash equilibrium between the forming coalition
and all individual players in its complement. As in the present approach, based on deviations
in the underlying strategic form game, the  core assumes that the forming coalition expects
outside players to move along their (individual) reaction functions. Di¤erently from our
approach, however, there the forming coalition forms before choosing its Nash equilibrium
strategy in the game against its rivals, while here deviating coalitions directly switch to
new strategies in the underlying game, expecting their rivals to react in the same manner
as followers in a Stackelberg game. In applying our concept to the analysis of stability of
environmental coalitions, we may interpret these di¤erences as the description of di¤erent
structures in the process of deviation. While the  core seems to describe settings in which
the formation of a deviating coalition is publicly observed before the choice of strategies, our
approach best ts situations in which deviating coalitions can implement their new strategies
1More precisely, Hart and Kurz (1983) present endogenous coalition formation games and look at the
Strong Nash of these games. Other related papers (i.e., Chander and Tulkens (1998), Yi (1998)) look at the
Nash equilibrium taking as given the gamma and delta rule of coalition formation.
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before their formation is monitored, enjoying a positional advantage.
The conjectural cooperative equilibrium we propose in this paper, by assuming that re-
maining players are expected to optimally react according to their best response map, in-
troduces a very natural rationality requirement in the equilibrium concept. Moreover, the
coalitional incentives to object are considerably weakened with respect to the Strong Nash
Equilibrium, thus ensuring the existence of a cooperative conjectural equilibrium in all sym-
metric games in which playersactions are strategic complements in the sense of Bulow et al.
(1985), i.e., in all supermodular games (see Topkis (1998)).
1.2 An example of a conjectural cooperative equilibrium
Before formally dening the conjectural cooperative equilibrium, it is easy to introduce the
mechanics at works for the existence of such an equilibrium by means of the following 3x3
bi-matrix game.
A B C
A x; x d; h a; c
B h; d b; b e; f
C c; a f; e y; y
Suppose, in the game above, that (b; b) is an e¢ cient outcome, i.e, such to maximize
the sum of playerspayo¤. To be a cooperative equilibrium, the outcome (b; b) has to be
immune from either player switching her own strategy, given their expectation that the rival
would optimally react to the switch. When players actions are strategic substitutes (and the
game submodular), each players reaction map is downward sloped, implying that any move
from (b; b) by one player would generate a predicted outcome on the asymmetric diagonal
of the matrix. If we let, in the example, a > b > c > h, and b > a+c2 , then the e¢ cient
outcome (b; b) will not certainly be a conjectural cooperative equilibrium, for player 1 will
protably deviate from it (from B to A), conjecturing that her rivals best reply will go in
the opposite direction (from B to C), and getting a payo¤ of a > b. The same will happen
if c > b > a > e, in which case player 2 deviates by switching from B to C. In contrast,
suppose that the game above is supermodular, with the associated increasing reaction maps.
In this case, the conjectured outcomes in case of deviations from outcome (b; b) are only
(x; x) and (y; y). As a result, if either player nds it protable to switch either to A or to C
(with x > b and y > b, respectively) then the assumption that (b; b) is an e¢ cient outcome
is contradicted. We can conclude that (b; b) is a conjectural cooperative equilibrium of the
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symmetric game described above whenever supermodularity holds. Note that in our example,
if d > b, the e¢ cient outcome (b; b) is a conjectural cooperative equilibrium although it is
neither a Strong Nash Equilibrium nor a Nash Equilibrium.2 The above example, although
providing a clear insight of how both supermodularity and symmetry work in favour of the
existence of an equilibrium, contains two substantial simplications: the presence of only
two players, ruling out existence problems related to the formation of coalitions, as well as
the restriction to 3 strategies, thus forcing the increasing best replies to generate symmetric
outcomes, from which, the fact that (B,B) is an equilibrium, directly follows. However, in
the paper we are able to show that the existence result holds for any number of players and
strategies, provided a symmetry assumption on the e¤ect of playersown strategies on the
payo¤ of rivals is fullled.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduce the conjectural cooperative
equilibrium in the standard setup of strategic form games. Section 3 presents the main
paper result: for a well dened class of games, symmetric supermodular games, a conjectural
cooperative equilibrium always exists. Section 4 discusses in detail the meaning of this
result and presents a descriptive example of an environmental economy whose cooperative
conjectural equilibrium exists depending on individualspreferences. Section 5 concludes.
2 Set Up
We consider a game in strategic form G =
 
N; (Xi; ui)i2N

, in which N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng
is the set of players, Xi is the set of strategies for player i, with generic element xi, and
ui : X1 :::Xn ! R+ is the payo¤ function of player i. We denote by S  N any coalition
of players, and by S its complement with respect to N . For each coalition S, we denote by
xS 2 XS 
Q
i2S Xi a prole of strategies for the players in S, and use the notation X = XN
and x = xN . A Pareto Optimum (PO) for G is a strategy prole such that there exists
no alternative prole which is preferred by all players to and strictly preferred by at least
one player. The Pareto Optimum xe is e¢ cient if it maximizes the sum of the payo¤s of
all players in N . In the example discussed in the above introduction, letting outcomes be
ordered as follows: a > b > c > d > e > h > x > y, and assuming that b > a+c2 , the proles
(a; c), (c; a) and (b; b) are all Pareto Optima, while the e¢ cient prole is (b; b).
A Nash Equilibrium (NE) for G is dened as a strategy prole x 2 XN such that no
player has an incentive to change his own strategy, i.e., such that there exists no i 2 N and
2Similarly, in a 2x2 Prisoners Dilemma, although no Strong Nash Equilibria exist, the e¢ cient strategy
prole, that is not even a Nash equilibrium, turns out to be a CCE.
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xi 2 Xi such that
ui(xi; xNni) > ui(x).
Nash equilibria are stable with respect to individual deviations, given that the e¤ect of
such deviations is evaluated keeping the strategies played by the other players xed at the
equilibrium levels.
In trying to formulate equilibrium concepts that allow coalitions of players to coordinate
in the choice of their strategies, a natural extension of the Nash equilibrium is given by the
concept of Strong Nash equilibrium (SNE), a strategy prole that no coalition of players
can improve upon given that the e¤ect of deviations is, again, evaluated keeping the strategies
of other players xed at the equilibrium levels. So, x^ 2 XN is a SNE for G if there exists no
S  N and xS 2 XS such that
ui(xS ; x^ S)  ui(x^) 8i 2 S;
uh(xS ; x^ S) > uh(x^) for some h 2 S:
Obviously, all SNE of G are both Nash Equilibria and Pareto Optima. As a result, SNE fails
to exist in many economic problems, and in particular, whenever Nash Equilibria fail to be
Optimal. Although the lack of existence of SNE can be interpreted as a poor specication
of the game theoretic model, it precludes the use of this otherwise appealing concept of a
cooperative equilibrium in many important applications.
In this paper we propose a concept of cooperative equilibrium for G based on the intro-
duction of non-zero conjectures in the evaluation of the protability of coalitional deviations.
The concept we propose captures the idea that players outside a deviating coalition are ex-
pected to react by making optimal choices (contingent on the strategy prole played in the
deviation) as independent and noncooperative players. In order to describe the conjectured
optimizing reactions of players outside a deviating coalition S, let us dene rst the restricted
game G(xS) obtained from G by considering the restricted set of players S, and parameter-
izing payo¤s by letting each j in S obtain the payo¤ uj(x S ; xS) out of the prole x S , for each
x S 2 X S . We denote by R S : XS ! X S the map associating with each joint strategy xS of
coalition S the set R S(xS) of Nash Equilibria of the restricted game G(xS). The set R S(xS)
describes the conjecture of coalition S on the possible reactions of players in S to the choice
of the joint strategy xS .
Denition 1 A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE) is a strategy prole ex
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such that there exists no coalition S, strategy proles xS 2 XS and x S 2 R S(xS) such that:
ui(xS ; x S))  ui(ex) 8i 2 S
uh(xS ; x S)) > uh(ex) for some h 2 S:
So dened, a CCE satises very restrictive stability requirements. According to denition
1, any coalition S can look for improvements upon any proposed strategy prole by selecting
among its feasible joint proles xS 2 XS and, for each possible xS it may choose, by selecting
among all the Nash responses of players in S (formally, the set R S) the most protable
strategy x S . Denition 1 is indeed well dened both when the set R S(xS) may be empty
for some (possibly all) xS 2 XS , and when the set R S(xS) is multivalued for some (possibly
all) xS 2 XS . In this sense, it applies to all games in strategic form. This generality comes
at the price of the arguably unreasonable assumption that a deviating coalition faces no
constraint in selecting among the possibly non unique reactions of outside players. A more
realistic approach would assume that a deviating coalition should form expectations about
which equilibrium reaction would be played by outside players, and that these expectations
should be based on some sort of rationality requirement on the behaviour of such outside
players. We remark, however, that the present approach generates a smaller set of equilibria
than would result from any arbitrary selection from the set of Nash responses of outside
players. Our result of existence of a CCE in all supermodular games, contained in theorem 1
in section 3.3, would therefore extend to any equilibrium concept associated with the choice
of such a selection. In addition, lemmas 7-10 show that the present denition generates the
same set of equilibria that would result from the selection of the Pareto dominant element
of the set R S(xS). Since the existence of such elements is not generally ensured, but always
holds on the class of symmetric supermodular games for which our result is obtained (see
section 3.1 for denitions), we have chosen to present denition 1 in its present, and more
general, form.
3 Existence of a conjectural cooperative equilibrium in super-
modular games
This section contains our main result, showing that if a strategic form game G is super-
modular, and satises some symmetry requirements, then admits a conjectural cooperative
equilibrium.
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3.1 Supermodularity
We start by dening the concept of a supermodular function and by recording some results
in the theory of supermodularity that will be used in the analysis of the next section. For a
partially ordered set A  Rn and any pair of elements x; y of A, we dene the join element
(x ^ y) and the meet element (x _ y) as follows:
(x ^ y) = (min fx1; y1g ; :::;min fxn; yng) ;
(x _ y) = (max fx1; y1g ; :::;max fxn; yng) :
Denition 2 The set A is a sublattice of Rn if (x_ y) 2 A and (x^ y) 2 A for all x; y 2 A.
Denition 3 The function f : A! R is supermodular if for all x; y 2 A :
f (x _ y) + f(x ^ y)  f(x) + f(y):
Denition 4 Let X;Y be partially ordered sets. The function f : XY ! R has increasing
di¤erences in (x; y) on XY if the term f(x; y00) f(x; y0) is increasing in x for all y00 > y0.
Increasing di¤erences describe a complementarity property of the function f , whose mar-
ginal increase with respect to y is increasing in x. If A is the Cartesian product of partially
ordered sets, then the fact that f is supermodular on A implies that f has increasing dif-
ference in all pairs of sets among those whose product originates A (see Topkis (1998) for a
formal statement and proof of this fact).
Denition 5 The game in strategic form G =
 
N; (Xi; ui)i2N

is supermodular if the set X
of feasible joint strategies for N is a sublattice of Rn, if the payo¤ functions ui(xi; x i) is
supermodular in xi and has increasing di¤erences in (xi; x i) on Xi X i.
We will extensively exploit two properties of supermodular games, related to the existence
of a Nash Equilibrium and to the behaviour of the set of Nash equilibria in response to changes
in a xed parameter on which these equilibria depend. We recall these properties below, and
refer to Topkis (1998) for proofs.
Lemma 1 Let G =
 
N; (Xi; ui)i2N

be a supermodular game, with X nonempty and compact
and ui upper hemicontinuous in xi for all i. Then the set of Nash equilibria of G is nonempty
and admits a greatest and least element.
Lemma 2 Let Gt =

N;
 
Xi; u
t
i

i2N

t2T
be a set of supermodular games, parameterized by
t, with T being a partially ordered set. Let the assumptions of Lemma 1 hold. Then the
greatest and least elements of the set of Nash equilibria of G are non decreasing in t on T .
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3.2 Assumptions and preliminary results
We impose the following lattice structure and continuity assumptions on our game in strategic
form.
Assumption 1 Xi is a compact sublattice of R, for all i 2 N .
Assumption 2 ui is continuous and supermodular in xi on Xi for each x i 2 X i, and
exhibits increasing di¤erences on Xi X i.
Our requirement of continuity of ui is unnecessarily strong for the establishment of exis-
tence and monotonicity of Nash equilibria in the next lemmas. However, we will need such
assumption to ensure the existence of a strategy prole with certain properties in X as a
step towards the proof of theorem 1 (see lemma 9). In addition to assumptions 1 and 2, we
impose two symmetry requirements on G.
Assumption 3 (Symmetric Players): For all x 2 X and all pairwise permutations p : N !
N :
up(i)
 
xp(1); :::; xp(n)

= ui (x1; :::; xn) :
Assumption 4 (Symmetric Externalities): One of the following two cases must hold:
1. Positive externalities: ui(x) increasing in xNni for all i and all x 2 XN ;
2. Negative externalities: ui(x) decreasing in xNni for all i and all x 2 XN .
Assumption 3 requires that players payo¤s are neutral to switches in the strategies played
by other players, and that pairwise switches in strategies are mirrored by pairwise switches
in payo¤s. In other words, only strategies matter, and not who plays them. Assumption
4 requires that the e¤ect of a change in other players strategies on ones own payo¤ is
monotonic, and its sign is the same for all players. Many well known games (including
Cournot, Betrand and public good games) satisfy this symmetry assumption. The next
results directly follow from an applications to our game G of the properties of supermodular
games listed in lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 3 Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For all xS 2 XS, the set of Nash equilibria R S(xS)
is nonempty and has a greatest and a least element.
Proof 1 Application of lemma 1.
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Let rgS and r
l
S
the selections of the map R S obtained by considering its greatest and least
element, respectively.
Lemma 4 Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold. The maps ruS and r
l
S
are non decreasing in xS.
Proof 2 Application of lemma 2.
We nally make use of the symmetry assumptions 3 and 4 to show that the set R S(xS)
is Pareto ranked.
Lemma 5 Let assumptions 1-4 hold. If the payo¤ functions exhibit positive (negative) ex-
ternalities, then for all xS the element r
g
S
(xS) (rlS (xS)) Pareto dominates all other elements
in R S on the set of players S.
Proof 3 Let j 2 S, x S 2 R S (xS) and x0S = r
g
S
(xS) for some xS 2 XS. Let externalities be
positive. The following inequality follows:
uj(xS ; x
0
Snj ; x
0
j)  uj(xS ; x0Snj ; xj)  uj(xS ; x S):
The rst inequality is due to the Nash equilibrium property of x0S for the restricted game
G(xS). The second inequality is due to positive externalities. Since the argument applies to
all j in S and for all x S 2 R S (xS), the result follows. The proof for the case of negative
externalities is similar and is omitted.
3.3 Results
This section contains our main result: all games satisfying assumptions 1-4 admit a Conjec-
tural Cooperative Equilibrium. The proof of theorem 1 is constructive: we show that every
e¢ cient symmetric strategy prole in XN satises the conditions for being a CCE. Before
proving this fact in theorem 1, we establish a few preliminary results. We rst show that an
e¢ ciency symmetric strategy prole always exists under assumptions 1-4.
Lemma 6 Let G satisfy assumption 1-4. Then there exists an e¢ cient strategy prole xe 2
XN such that xei = x
e
j for all i; j 2 N:
Proof 4 Compactness of each Xi implies compactness of X. Continuity of each ui implies
continuity of the social payo¤ function uN =
P
i2N ui. Existence of an e¢ cient prole directly
follows from Weiestrass theorem. To show that there exists a symmetric e¢ cient prole, we
need to exploit the supermodularity properties of payo¤ functions. Consider any arbitrary
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asymmetric prole x, with xi 6= xj for some players i and j. By the symmetry assumption
on payo¤ functions, we write
uN (x) = uN (xi; xj ; xNnfi;jg) = uN (xj ; xi; xNnfi;jg) (1)
where we have used the convention of writing the strategies of players i and j as rst and
second elements of x, respectively. Since the sum of supermodular functions is itself super-
modular, assumptions 1 and 2 imply:
2  uN (x)  uN
 
xi; xi; xNnfi[jg

+ uN
 
xj ; xj ; xNnfi[jg

: (2)
It follows that either
uN (x)  uN
 
xi; xi; xNnfi[jg

(3)
or
uN (x)  uN
 
xj ; xj ; xNnfi[jg

(4)
or both.
Suppose that (3) holds, and let x0 =
 
xi; xi; xNnfi[jg

. This is without loss of generality
for the ongoing argument. If xk = xi for all k 2 Nn fi [ jg our proof is complete. If not,
then let xk 6= xi. In this case, again by supermodularity of payo¤ functions, we write
2  uN (x0)  uN
 
xi; xi; xi; xNnfi[j[kg

+ uN
 
xi; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg

: (5)
Condition (5) implies, again, that either
uN (x
0)  uN
 
xi; xi; xi; xNnfi[j[kg

(6)
or
uN (x
0)  uN
 
xi; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg

(7)
or both. Suppose rst that only (7) holds. Using the denition of x0 we obtain
uN
 
xi; xi; xk; xNnfi[j[kg
  uN  xi; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg : (8)
For this case, using again supermodularity, we write
2uN
 
xi; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg
  uN  xi; xi; xk; xNnfi[j[kg+ uN  xk; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg : (9)
Using (8) and (9) we obtain that
uN
 
xi; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg
  uN  xk; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg : (10)
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Conditions (8) and (10) directly imply
uN (x
0)  uN
 
xk; xk; xk; xNnfi[j[kg

: (11)
We have therefore shown that either (6) or (9) must hold. By iteration of the same operation
for each additional player in Nn fi [ j [ kg, we obtain the conclusion that there exists some
symmetric prole xs for which uN (xs)  uN (x). Since the starting prole x was arbitrary,
and by the existence of an e¢ cient prole proved in the rst part of this proof, we conclude
that a symmetric e¢ cient prole xe always exists under assumptions 1-4.
We now consider the possible joint strategies that an arbitrary coalition S can use in
order to improve upon an e¢ cient prole xe. In particular, we focus on the beststrategies
S can adopt, by this meaning the proles x (S) 2 XN satisfying the two following properties:
i) xS 2 R S (xS); ii) there exists no x0S 2 XS and x0S 2 R S (x0S) such that ui
 
x0S ; x
0
S
  ui (x)
8i 2 S and uh (x0S ; r S (x0S)) > uh (x) for at least one h 2 S. In words, x(S) is a Pareto
optimal prole for coalition S in the set F (S) of all proles that are consistent with the
reaction map R S :
F (S) = fx 2 XN : x S 2 R S (xS)g :
Note that F (S) is a compact set by the compactness of XN and by the closedness of the
Nash correspondence R S (xS).
Lemma 7 Let G satisfy assumptions 1-4. Then for all x0 2 F (S) there exists some prole
x(S) 2 XN which is a best strategy for S in the sense of conditions i) and ii) above and such
that ui(x(S))  ui(x0) for all i 2 S.
Proof 5 Let x0 2 F (S). If x0 = x(S) for some x(S) then the lemma is proved for x0. If
x0 6= x(S) for all x(S), then let the set
Pi(x
0) =

xN 2 F (S) : ui(x)  ui(x0)
	
dene the set of strategy proles that are weakly preferred by player i to x0. The set Pi(x0) is
nonempty by the fact that x0 6= x(S) for all x(S), and it is closed and bounded by continuity
of ui and by compactness of F (S). Since this holds for all i 2 S, it follows that the set
PS(x
0) = \i2SPi(x0) is closed and bounded.3 Moreover, it is non empty because x0 6= x(S).
We can therefore conclude that the problem
max
x2PS(x)
X
i2S
iui(x)
3We remind here that S is a nite set.
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has a solution for all  in the interior of the #S   1 dimensional unitary simplex. Call x()
such a solution. Clearly, x() satises conditions i) and ii) dening the prole x(S). Also,
clearly x() Pareto dominates x0 on the set of players S, which concludes the proof.
By lemma 7, we can restrict our analysis to the bestchoices x(S) of coalition S, since
if S cannot protably deviate by any such proles, it cannot deviate by means of any prole
in F (S). We remark here that in the choice of a bestprole x(S), coalition S is assumed
able to select among all the possible (equilibrium) reactions of S, as specied by R S , in order
to maximize its joint payo¤. This is in line with our denition of a CCE, in which this ability
of S was implicitly assumed. The next lemma shows that under assumptions 3 and 4 the
best choice of S always selects strategies for S that are greater (least) elements of the set
R S (xS), depending on the sign of the externality being positive or negative, respectively.
Lemma 8 Let G satisfy positive (negative) externalities. Let S  N and x0 2 F (S).
Then, ui

x0S ; r
g
S
(x0S)

 ui (x0) (respectively, ui
 
x0S ; r
l
S
(x0S)
  ui (x0)) for all i 2 S.
Proof 6 We show only the case of positive externalities; the proof for negative externalities
is symmetric and left to the reader. Since rgS (x
0
S)  x S for all x S 2 R S (x0S), and since
x0S 2 R S (x0S), positive externalities imply that ui

xS ; r
g
S
(x0S)

 ui
 
xS ; x
0
S

for all xS..
The implications of lemmas 7 and 8 are better illustrated by referring to the sets F g(S) 
F (S) and F l  F (S), dened as follows:
F g(S) =
n
x 2 F (S) : x S = rgS (xS)
o
;
F l(S) =
n
x 2 F (S) : x S = rlS (xS)
o
:
Lemmas 8 implies that, under positive externalities, the same strategy prole x(S), maxi-
mizing (by lemma 7) the aggregate payo¤ of S over the set F (S) for some vector of weights
, also maximizes the same aggregate payo¤ over the set F g(S). The same conclusion can
be drawn, with respect to the set F l(S), for the case of negative externalities. This result is
important for two reasons. First, it endows the somewhat problematic assumption that S can
select among Nash reactions of players in S - which, as we said, is implicit in the denition of
a CCE and of the set F (S) above - with the more appealing interpretation that the Pareto
dominant Nash equilibrium will be played by members of S. This interpretation is supported
by the result of Lemma 5, by which the greater and least elements of R S (x
0
S) are the best
choices for S under positive and negative externalities, respectively. Second, the result of
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lemma 8 allows us to exploit the properties of the maps rgS (xS) and r
l
S
(xS) in supermodular
games. This is done in the next lemma, in which these properties are shown to imply that
at x(S) the strategies played by members of S and of S are ordered according to the sign of
the externality: under positive externalities, players in S play greaterstrategies than those
in S, while the opposite is true under negative externalities.
Lemma 9 Let i 2 S and j 2 S, and denote by x 2 X and y 2 X the strategies of player
i 2 S and player j 2 S, respectively, at x (S). Then:
i) positive externalities imply x  y;
ii) negative externalities imply y  x.
Proof 7 For simplicity of notation, let x denote the prole x(S). Let Ui(x; y)  ui

xSni; x; x

NnSnj ; y

,
and similarly let Uj(x; y) = uj

xSni; x; x

NnSnj ; y

. We use supermodularity of ui to write:
Ui(y; y) + Ui(x; x)  Ui(x; y) + Ui(y; x): (12)
By the properties of x,
Uj(x; y)  Uj(x; x); (13)
implying by symmetry that
Ui(y; x)  Ui(x; x): (14)
Using (12) and (14) we obtain
Ui(y; y)  Ui(x; y) = ui(x): (15)
Now suppose that y > x and assume that the game has positive externalities. By lemma 4,
the equilibrium best response map has non decreasing greatest element, so that
y > x) rgS(xSni; y)  r
g
S
(xS) = x

S : (16)
By positive externalities
ui(x

Sni; y; r
g
S
(xSni; y)) > ui(x

Sni; y; r
g
S
(xS)) = Ui(y; y): (17)
Equations (15) and (17) imply
ui

xSni; y; r
g
S
(xSni; y)

> ui(x
): (18)
Finally, since y > x, positive externalities also imply that for every player k 2 Sni:
uk

xSni; y; r
g
S
(xSni; y)

 uk(x): (19)
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Both 18 and 19 contradict the assumption that x is a Pareto Optimum. Suppose now that
y < x and assume that the game has negative externalities. Supermodularity of ui and uj
imply
y < x) rlS(xSni; y)  rlS(xS) = xS : (20)
By negative externalities
ui(x

Sni; y; r
l
S(x

Sni; y))  ui(xSni; y; rlS(xS)) = Ui(y; y): (21)
Again, equation (22) imply
ui(x

Sni; y; r
l
S(x

Sni; y)) > ui(x
): (22)
and, by negative externalities,
uk

xSni; y; r
g
S
(xSni; y)

> uk(x
) (23)
for every k 2 Sni, a contradiction.
Since by lemma 7 we can restrict our attention to the proles x(S), we will use the
above result as a characterizing of the strategies played in the only relevant proles that
may be used in any deviation from an e¢ ciency prole xe. The next result makes use of this
characterization to prove that at any prole x (S), the members of S cannot be better o¤than
the members of S. This result generalizes to the present setting of coalitional actions a well
known property of the subgame perfect equilibrium in two player symmetric supermodular
games, in which the leaderis weakly worse o¤ than the follower.
Lemma 10 Let i 2 S and j 2 S. Then uj(x (S))  ui(x (S)).
Proof 8 For simplicity, let again x denote the prole x(S). The following inequalities hold:
uj
 
xS ; x

S
  uj xS ; xSnj ; xi  uj xSni; xj ; xSnj ; xi : (24)
The rst part is implied by the conditions dening the prole x; the second part follows from
lemma 9 and assumption 4. By assumption 3, we also have
uj

xSni; x

j ; x

Snj ; x

i

= ui
 
xS ; x

S

: (25)
Inequalities (24) and (25) imply
uj (x
)  ui (x) ;
which proves the result.
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We are now ready to show that an e¢ cient strategy prole xe satises the requirements
of a Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Let the game G satisfy assumption 1-4. Then, G admits a conjectural coopera-
tive equilibrium.
Proof 9 Let xe be a symmetric e¢ cient strategy prole for G, that is, a symmetric strategy
prole that maximizes the aggregate payo¤ of N . Let u(xe) denote the payo¤ of each agent
at xe. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a coalition S  N such that for all i 2 S:
ui(x
(S))  u(xe) (26)
with strict inequality for at least one h 2 S. Note that by lemma 10, it must be thatP
i2S
ui(x
(S))
s

P
j2 S
uj (x
(S))
n  s ; (27)
otherwise there would exist i 2 S and j 2 S for which
ui (x
(S)) > uj (x(S)) :
By condition (27) we obtain the following implication:P
i2S
ui(x
(S))
s
> u(xe))
P
j2 S
uj (x
(S))
n  s > u(x
e): (28)
We conclude that if ui(x(S))  u(xe) for all i 2 S, with strict inequality for at least one
h 2 S, then using (26) and (28), we obtain
s
P
i2S
ui(x
(S))
s
+ (n  s)
P
j2 S
uj (x
(S))
n  s > s u(x
e) + (n  s)u(xe) (29)
or, X
i2N
ui(x
(S)) > n u(xe) (30)
which contradicts the e¢ ciency of xe.
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4 On the Existence of Equilibria in Submodular Games
4.1 The Role of the Slope of the Reaction Map
Theorem 1 establishes su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a conjectural cooperative
equilibrium of the game G. The crucial condition, strategic complementarity in the sense of
Bulow et al. (1985), generates non decreasing best replies; in particular, the supermodularity
of payo¤ functions implies that the Nash responses of players outside a deviating coalition
are a non decreasing function of the strategies of coalitional members. This feature ensures
that each players outside S is better o¤ than each coalitional member of S when deviating.
Deviations by proper subcoalitions of players are therefore little protable, while the grand
coalition, not a¤ected by this deviators curse, produces a su¢ ciently big aggregate payo¤
for a stable cooperative outcomes to exist. In this section we show how the same mechanics
responsible for our existence result on the class of supermodular games, provide useful insight
for the analysis of games with strategic substitutes, as, for instance, environmental and public
goods games. We will use as an illustration an environmental Cobb-Douglas economy to show
that as long as best replies are not too decreasing (thereby providing deviating coalitions
with a not toobig positional advantage), stable cooperative outcomes exist.
4.2 An illustration using a Cobb-Douglas environmental economy
We consider an economy with set of agents N = f1; ::i; ::; ng, in which z  0 is the environ-
mental quality enjoyed by agents, xi  0 is a private good, pi  0 is a polluting emission
originated as a by-product of the production of xi. We assume that for each i in N preferences
are represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function
ui (z; xi) = z
x;
technology is described by the production function
xi = p

i ;
and emissions accumulate according to the additive law
z (p) = A 
X
i2N
pi (31)
where A is a constant expressing the quality of a pollution-free environment. We will assume
that ;  and  are all positive and   1. We associate with this economy the game
Ge with players set N , strategy space

0; p0i

for each i, with
P
i2N p
0
i < A, and payo¤s
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Ui(p1; :::; pn) = z
pi , where  = . Using this (symmetric) setup, we can express the
maximal per-capita payo¤ of each coalition S in the event of a deviation from an arbitrary
strategy prole in G as follows:
ui (S) = s
 A+2 (+ )   (+  (n  s))  : (32)
This simple setup of an environmental economy can be used to illustrate how CCE exist when
best replies are not too decreasing or, in other terms, when strategies are not too substitute.
This in turn requires that playersutilities does not decrease too much with other players
choice, a property mainly depending on the level of log-concavity of the term z (p). We prove
this analytically for the case  = 1, while we rely on numerical simulation for the general case.
Note that z (p) is log-concave (and the game is not log-supermodular) for  > 0, and best
replies are decreasing. The environmental game admits a unique Nash equilibrium p with
pi =
A
+n for every i 2 N , and a unique e¢ cient prole pe (by e¢ cient we mean aggregate
welfare maximizer). Simple algebra yields the following expression:
ui (S) = s
 1A+12 (+ 1)  1 (+ n  s)  :
The protability of individual deviation from the e¢ cient strategy prole pe is evaluated as
follows:
ui (p
e)  ui (S) =  (+ n  1)  n  1 < 0,  < 1:
It follows that when the function z(p) is strictly concave ( < 1), then no CCE exists.
However, when  = 1, the CCE is unique, and equal to pe. It is also easy to show that for
 > 1 (z(:) convex ) the strategy prole pe is still a CCE. We conclude that the existence of
a CCE only requires a not too strong log-concavity of z(:). This ensures that the marginal
utility of each consumer does not decrease too much with the rivalsprivate consumption
and hence, a deviating coalition, by expanding its pollution (and private consumption) does
not exploit too much its advantage against complementary players. When this is the case,
although the environmental game is a natural strategic substitutegame, the CCE exists.
It is interesting to relate the existence of a stable cooperative (and e¢ cient) solution with
the relative magnitude of the parameters ,  and , expressing the intensity of preferences
for the environment and for private consumption, and the characteristics of technology. It
turns out that in order for an agreement on emissions to be reached, agents must put enough
weight on the environment in their preferences (high enough ), and emissions must not
be too productive according to the available technology. In other words, this conclusion
rephrases the common intuition that a clean environment is sustainable only if agents care
enough for ambient quality. As we said, the analysis of existence of a CCE for the general
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case (that is, removing the assumption  = 1) is not possible in analytical terms. In what
follows we show by means of computations that the set of CCEa of the game  e can be
characterized with respect to three possible congurations of the parameter ;  and  of
the economy: the case  = , in which the CCE is unique and assigning to each player the
payo¤ ui(pe) (for this case we provide an analytical proof); the case  > , in which the set
of CCEa strictly includes the prole pe; the case  < , in which the set of CCE is empty.
Proposition 1 If  =  the unique CCE is the e¢ cient prole pe.
Proof 10 We rst show that no prole p 6= pe can be a CCE. By 32 we obtain
ui (p
e)  ui (fig) =
A+ (+ )   

(+  (n  1))   n
n (+  (n  1))
from which
ui (p
e)  ui (fig) = 0()
h
(+  (n  1))   n
i
= 0;
Using the fact that  =  we geth
(+  (n  1))   n
i
= [+  (n  1)]   (n) = 0
from which
ui (p
e) = ui (fig) :
To show that pe is a CCE, it su¢ ces to show that ui (S)  ui (pe) for all coalitions S such
that s > 1. Using 32 we obtain
ui (p
e)  ui (S)  0()
h
s (+  (n  s))   n
i
 0
which, using again the fact that  =  reduces to
ui (p
e)  ui (S)  0() [s (+  (n  s))]  (n) .
The last condition can be rewritten as
ui (p
e)  ui (S)  0() s+ (n  s) s+ s2  n+ s2
which is always satised since s  1.
Proposition 2 If  >  then pe is a CCE.
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Proof 11 We proceed by numerical simulations. Our aim is to show that whenever  > 
the di¤erence ui (pe)   ui (S) is positive for every s. We rst consider the case s = 1. We
plot the graph of
fi (; n)  max f(ui (pe)  ui (fig)) ; 0g
for the xed value of  = 0:5. The domains are taken to be (1; 10000) for n and (0; 1) for
.From Figure 1 it is evident that ui (pe) > ui (fig) whenever  > 0:5 = . Similar graph are
obtained for other values of  in the range (0; 1). We perform the same exercise for coalition
of size s > 1. We plot the function
f (; s)  max f(ui (pe)  ui (fSg)) ; 0g
for x values of n and . The domains are taken to be (; 1) for  and (1; n] for s. For the
case n = 1000 and  = 0:2 we obtain the following graph:In Figure 2 the graph of f (; s) all
lies above the zero plane for all values of s 2 (1; n] and of  2 (; 1). Summing up, whenever
 >  we found that ui (pe) > ui fig for s  1; we thus conclude that whenever  >  then pe
is a CCE.
Proposition 3 If  >  there exists no CCE.
Proof 12 We again proceed by numerical simulations and evaluate the function
f^i (; n)  min f(ui (pe)  ui (fig)) ; 0g
for an arbitrary player i 2 N and a xed value of . The domains are taken to be (0; 1) for 
and [1; 10000] for n. Figure 3 depicts the graph of f^i (; n) for the case  = 0:5.It is evident
from Figure 3 (and from numerical evaluations around the point  = 0:5) that for any value
of n in the selected range, ui (pe) < ui (fig) for the whole range of values of  < . We thus
conclude that for such values there is no CCE.
The above results can be usefully summarized by plotting the value of the di¤erence
[ui (p
e)  ui fig] as a function of the parameter  for xed values of ; n and for s = 1.
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